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Abstract—So far, the problem of positioning in wireless networks
has been studied mainly in a nonadversarial setting. In this paper,
we analyze the resistance of positioning techniques to position and
distance spoofing attacks. We propose a mechanism for secure po-
sitioning of wireless devices, that we call verifiable multilateration.
We then show how this mechanism can be used to secure posi-
tioning in sensor networks. We analyze our system through sim-
ulations.
Index Terms—Ad hoc networks, positioning, secure protocols,
security, sensor networks, wireless.
I. INTRODUCTION
RESEARCHERS have proposed a number of positioningand distance estimation techniques for wireless networks
[3], [6], [16], [30], [41], [42]. However, they all studied these
techniques in nonadversarial settings. Distance estimation and
positioning techniques are, nevertheless, highly vulnerable to
attacks from internal and external attackers. Internal attackers
can report false position and distance information in order to
cheat on their position. External attackers can modify (spoof)
the measured positions and distances of wireless nodes.
In this paper, we propose a mechanism for the secure posi-
tion computation and verification of positions of wireless de-
vices. We call our mechanism verifiable multilateration (VM).
This mechanism is based on the measurements of the time of
radio signal propagation [i.e., time-of-flight (ToF)]; it consists
of conventional multilateration with distance bounding or au-
thenticated ranging, and it enables verification of node positions
by a set of (at least three) base stations, which do not need to be
tightly synchronized.
Because of its simplicity, VM can be used for securing posi-
tioning in a variety of systems. In this paper, we focus on sensor
network positioning, and we show how VM can ensure secure
positioning of sensors in the presence of adversaries. We call
this scheme SPINE, a system for Secure Positioning In sensor
NEtworks. We present a security and performance analysis of
SPINE.
The organization of this paper is the following. In Section II,
we review positioning techniques and analyze attacks against
them. In Section III, we describe a technique for radio frequency
distance bounding. In Section IV, we describe our technique for
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position verification called VM (VM). In Section V, we present
a scheme for secsecure positioning of a network of sensors. In
Section VI, we present an overview of current proposals and
techniques for positioning in wireless networks, based on VM.
We conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. ATTACKS AGAINST POSITION AND
DISTANCE ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES
We now review positioning and distance estimation tech-
niques and analyze their vulnerabilities.
A. Attacker Model
First, we briefly present our attacker model. We call an at-
tacker external if it cannot authenticate itself as an honest net-
work node to other network nodes or to a central authority. We
call an attacker internal if the node is compromised or if the
user controlling the node is malicious. We assume that mali-
cious and compromised nodes can authenticate themselves to
the authority and to other network nodes. We assume that when
a node is compromised, its secret keys and other secrets that it
shares with other nodes are known to the attacker. Furthermore,
we assume that users have full access to their devices, meaning
also to their authentication material.
Similarly, we observe two types of attacks: internal and ex-
ternal. Internal attacks are those in which an internal attacker
reports a false position or convinces the positioning infrastruc-
ture that it is at a false position. External attacks are those in
which an (external) attacker convinces an honest node and the
positioning infrastructure that the node is at a different position
from its true position (i.e., the attacker spoofs node’s position).
We distinguish two types of positioning systems: node-cen-
tric and infrastructure-centric. By a node-centric positioning
system we mean that a node computes its position by observing
signals received from public base stations with known loca-
tions. If the positioning system is node-centric, internal attacks
are generally straightforward: the attacker simply lies about the
position that it computed. Infrastructure-centric positioning
systems are those in which the infrastructure computes posi-
tions of nodes based on their mutual communication.
In multilateration-based approaches, an internal attacker
can cheat on its position by cheating on ranging mechanisms
(i.e., by reporting false signal strengths and times of signal
sending/reception). In time difference-of-arrival (TDOA) sys-
tems, an attacker can cheat by sending signals to base stations
at different times (in some cases, the attacker needs to have
directional antennas).
Attacks by external attackers are similar to those performed
by internal attackers. An external attacker can perform timing
0733-8716/$20.00 © 2006 IEEE
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TABLE I
VULNERABILITIES OF THE POSITIONING AND DISTANCE ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES TO DISTANCE AND POSITION SPOOFING ATTACKS
attacks by delaying (through jamming) or speeding-up (worm-
hole attacks [19]) the signals, or it can perform power level mod-
ification attacks by replaying signals between nodes and base
stations at different power levels.
B. Attacks on Global Positioning System (GPS)
The GPS is today the most widespread outdoor positioning
system for mobile devices. The system is based on a set of satel-
lites that provide a 3-D positioning with an accuracy of around
3 m. GPS also provides devices with an accurate time reference.
GPS, however, has several limitations: it cannot be used for in-
door positioning nor for positioning in dense urban regions: in
those cases, because of the interferences and obstacles, satel-
lite signals cannot reach the GPS devices. Furthermore, civilian
GPS was never designed for secure positioning. Civilian GPS
devices can be “spoofed” by GPS satellite simulators, that pro-
duce fake satellite radio signals that are stronger than the real
signals coming from satellites. Most current GPS receivers can
be totally fooled, accepting these stronger signals while ignoring
the weaker, authentic signals. GPS satellite simulators are legit-
imately used to test new GPS products and can be bought for
$10 k–$50 k or rented for just $1 k per month. Some simple
software changes to most GPS receivers would permit them to
detect relatively unsophisticated spoofing attacks [43]. Never-
theless, more sophisticated spoofing attacks would still be hard
to detect. Military GPS are protected from position spoofing by
codes that cannot be reproduced by the attackers.
Even if a mobile node is able to obtain its correct position
from the GPS satellites, the authority or another mobile node
have no way to verify the correctness of node’s position, unless
the mobile node is equipped with a trusted software or hardware
module [2], providing the correct position.
C. Attacks on Ultrasound (US) Positioning
US-based systems operate by measuring ToF of the sound
signal measured between two nodes. An interesting feature of
these systems is that, if used with RF signals, they do not require
any time synchronization between the sender and the receiver.
The limitations of the US-based systems are that, due to outdoor
interferences, they can be mainly used indoors.
US-based systems are vulnerable to distance reduction and
distance enlargement attacks by external and internal attacks.
To reduce the measured distance between two honest nodes, two
attackers can use a radio link, as it transmits the signal several or-
ders of magnitude faster than the US. Furthermore, by jamming
and replaying the signals at a later time, attackers can enlarge
the measured distances between honest nodes. With US-based
techniques, an internal attacker can also reduce or enlarge the
measured distance by laying about the signal sending/reception
times or by simply delaying its response to honest nodes. Re-
cently, Sastry et al. [35] have proposed a US-based distance
bounding technique which resists to distance reduction attacks
from internal attacks; it does not, however, resist to attacks from
external nodes.
D. Attacks on Radio (RF) Positioning
In techniques based on the received signal strength (RSS),
the distance is computed based on the transmitted and RSSs. To
cheat on the measured distance, an internal attacker, therefore,
only needs to report a false power level to an honest node. Mali-
cious attackers can also modify the measured distance between
two honest nodes by jamming the nodes’ mutual communica-
tion and by replaying the messages with higher or lower power
strengths.
RF ToF-based systems exhibit the best security properties. In
these systems, nodes measure their mutual distance based on
the time of propagation of the signal between them. Because
RF signals travel at the speed-of-light, an attacker can, by jam-
ming and replaying the signals, only increase, but not decrease
the measured ToF between the nodes. An internal attacker can
further cheat on the distance by laying about the signal trans-
mission and reception times.
An RF distance bounding technique proposed by Brands
and Chaum [4] exhibits better security properties than conven-
tional RF ToF distance estimation; it allows the nodes to upper
bound their distances to other nodes, meaning that it prevents
an internal attacker from reducing the measured distance.
As we will show in Section III in more detail, with RF ToF
distance-bounding protocols, attackers can only increase, but
not decrease the measured distances to honest nodes.
E. Conclusion
Our review of vulnerabilities of positioning systems is sum-
marized Table I. This table illustrates that the RF ToF-based po-
sitioning solutions are best suited for secure positioning. The
RF ToF distance estimation and distance bounding techniques
are the most effective techniques to counter attacks. The reason
is that with RF it is generally possible to perform precise non-
line-of-sight distance estimations; the precision of the system
can be very high (15 cm error with ultra-wideband (UWB) sys-
tems at a distance of 2 km [12]). A potential drawback of these
systems is that, because they operate with the speed-of-light, the
devices require fast-processing hardware.
III. DISTANCE BOUNDING AND AUTHENTICATED RANGING
Distance bounding techniques are used to upper bound the
distance of one device to another (compromised) device. As we
indicated in Table I, RF-based distance bounding protocols are
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Fig. 1. Distance bounding protocol.
vulnerable to distance enlargement attacks but not to distance
reduction attacks. Distance bounding protocols are used by a
verifier to verify that a claimant node being at a distance
from a verifier node , cannot claim to be at a distance
. These protocols were first introduced by Brands
and Chaum [4] to prevent Mafia fraud attacks.
The pseudocode of the distance bounding protocol is shown
in Fig. 1. In the first step of the protocol, the claimant com-
mits to a random value . The verifier replies with a chal-
lenge nonce , sends it to in a reverse bit order and starts
its timer as soon as the last bit of the challenge has been sent.
The claimant responds immediately with , upon re-
ceiving the challenge from . Once the verifier has received the
response from it stops the timer and converts the challenge-re-
sponse time to a distance . In the last step of the protocol,
authenticates itself to and reveals the decommit value . The
authentication and the authenticity of is ensured with a mes-
sage authentication code (MAC), using a secret key that
and share. Finally, verifies if the value received in the
time-measuring phase corresponds to the received (commit, de-
commit) pair .
The commitment scheme needs to satisfy two properties:
1) a user who commits to a certain value cannot change this
value afterwards (we say that the scheme is binding) and
2) the commitment is hidden from its receiver until the sender
“opens” it (we say that the scheme is hiding). A commitment
scheme transforms a value into a commitment/opening
pair , where reveals no information about , but
together reveal , and it is infeasible to find such that
reveals . Simple commitment schemes can be realized
with hash functions, which do not impose high computational
requirements on sensor nodes.
The described protocol is suitable for devices that can
perform rapid message exchanges, execute XOR operations
rapidly, and perform encryption. In the case of RF-based dis-
tance bounding, the most important assumptions are that the
claimant needs to be able to bound its processing (XOR) to a
few nanoseconds, and that the verifier needs to be able to
measure time with nanosecond precision (1 ns corresponds to
the time that it takes an electromagnetic wave to propagate over
30 cm). This requirement allows the node to perform distance
bounding with radio signals with an uncertainty of 30 cm. We
are aware that a nanosecond processing and time measurements
are achievable only with dedicated hardware. Recent develop-
ments in location system show that RF time of flight systems
Fig. 2. Authenticated ranging protocol.
based on UWB can achieve nanosecond precision of measured
times of signal flight (and consequently of the distances). The
tests with multispectral solution’s UWB precision asset loca-
tion system [13] consisting of active tags and tracking devices
show that this system can provide two-dimensional (2-D) and
three-dimensional (3-D) location of objects to within a few
centimeters. The range of the system is 100 m indoor and 2 km
outdoor. The used UWB tags are active and roughly the size of
a wristwatch, weighing approximately 40 grams each.
In the case of a US-based distance bounding, node processing
speed and clock accuracy can be of the order of milliseconds.
Thus, US distance bounding can be easily implemented with
off-the-shelf components such as microphones and 802.11 wire-
less cards [35].
Authenticated ranging protocols enable two honest and
trusted parties to measure their mutual distance in an authen-
ticated manner. Fig. 2 shows one possible realization of the
authenticated distance ranging protocol, inspired by Brand’s
and Chaum’s distance bounding protocol. Here, and
are the message sending and reception times at nodes
and , respectively; is the speed-of-light.
In this protocol, unlike in the distance bounding protocol, it
is not required that the claimant replies within a nanosecond
time, but only that it is able to measure time with that precision.
Given that the claimant and the verifier are mutually trusted,
the claimant reports its processing time to the verifier
which then computes the range based on the reported times
using speed-of-light.
Like in the distance bounding protocol, in this protocol, the
processing at the nodes is minimized during the ranging phase,
and most processing (MAC and commitment verification) is
performed a posteriori to the ranging.
The advantages of the ranging protocol over distance
bounding are in that the nodes do not need to have high-speed
hardware to perform XOR and that the channel does not need
to be reserved during the ranging phase (as processing and
channel access times are measured and reported). One disad-
vantage is that ranging is not resistant to distance reduction by
internal attackers.
A very important observation here is that, essentially, au-
thenticated ranging and distance bounding have the same re-
sistance to external attackers: the only attack that the external
attackers can successfully perform is distance enlargement. In
case of internal attackers, distance bounding prevents distance
reduction, whereas the authenticated ranging is vulnerable to
this attack.
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IV. VERIFIABLE MULTILATERATION (VM)
In Section II, we described security problems related to var-
ious positioning and distance estimation techniques, and in Sec-
tion III, we showed how the devices can upper bound their mu-
tual distances. We now propose a technique for position verifi-
cation that we call VM. This technique enables a secure compu-
tation and verification of the positions of mobile devices in the
presence of attackers. Here, by secure position computation we
mean that base stations compute the correct position of a node
in the presence of attacker, or that a node can compute its own
position in the presence of an attacker; by secure position ver-
ification we mean that the base stations can verify the position
reported by the node.
Multilateration is a technique for determining the position of
a (mobile) device from a set of reference points whose posi-
tions are known, based on the ranges measured between the ref-
erence points and the device. The position of the device in two
(three) dimensions can be computed if the device measured its
distance to three (four) reference points. As we already detailed
in Section II, distance estimation techniques are vulnerable to at-
tacks from internal and external attacks, which can maliciously
modify the measured distances. Multilateration is equally vul-
nerable to the same set of attacks because it relies on distance
estimations.
A. Algorithm
Verifiable multilateration relies on distance bounding (or on
authenticated ranging). It consists of distance bound measure-
ments from at least three reference points (verifiers) to the mo-
bile device (the claimant) and of subsequent computations per-
formed by an authority. In this description, we will assume that
the verification is performed with distance bounding. For sim-
plicity, we show the algorithm for 2-D positioning; at the end of
the section, we briefly comment on how a similar algorithm can
be applied to the 3-D case.
The intuition behind the VM algorithm is the following. Be-
cause of the distance bounding property, the claimant can only
pretend that it is more distant from the verifier than it really is.
If it increases the measured distance to one of the verifiers, in
order to keep the position consistent, the claimant needs to prove
that at least one of the measured distances to other verifiers is
shorter than it actually is, which it cannot because of the dis-
tance bounding. This property holds only if the position of the
claimant is determined within the triangle formed by the veri-
fiers. This can be explained with a simple example: if an object
is located within the triangle, and it moves to a different posi-
tion within the triangle, it will certainly reduce its distance to
at least one of the triangle vertices. The same properties hold if
an external attacker enlarges distances between verifiers and an
honest claimant. This basic intuition is illustrated in Fig. 3(a).
More precisely, the VM algorithm is executed by the verifiers,
as shown on Fig. 4.
In step 1 of the algorithm, the verifiers which are in
the power range of the claimant perform distance bounding to
the claimant and obtain distance bounds . These
distance bounds, as well as the positions of the verifiers (which
are known) are then reported to the central authority. In step
2, the authority computes an estimate of the claimant’s
Fig. 3. Examples of verifiable multilateration (VM). (a) With three verifiers.
(b) With six verifiers.
Fig. 4. Verifiable multilateration (VM) algorithm.
position; this position is computed by using distance bounds
from all verifiers in ’s neighborhood, typically by the min-
imum mean square estimate (MMSE)
In step 3 of the algorithm, the authority runs the following two
tests: 1) -test: for all , does the distance between
and differ from the measured distance bound by less than
the expected distance measurement error and 2) point in the
triangle test: does fall within at least one physical tri-
angle formed by a triplet of verifiers. Note also that we call the
triangle formed by the verifiers the verification triangle. If both
the and the point in the triangle tests are positive, the authority
accepts the estimated position of the claimant as cor-
rect; else, the position is rejected.
The expected error is a system parameter that depends on
the number of verifiers and on the distance estimation tech-
niques used. This error becomes smaller as more verifiers are
used to compute .
If both the and the point in the triangle tests are positive, this
means that the claimant falls in at least one verification triangle
, , , and that distance bounds are consistent
with the estimated position and with each other [Fig. 3(a)]. This
means that none of the distance bounds were
enlarged.
ˇCAPKUN AND HUBAUX: SECURE POSITIONING IN WIRELESS NETWORKS 225
Fig. 5. Detection of enlarged distances.
If any of the distance-bounds differs from the estimated
position by more than , this indicates that there is a
possible distance enlargement attack on one or more of the dis-
tance bounds that caused such an unexpectedly high error to
occur. If a larger number of verification triangles can be formed
around , the authority can try to detect which of the distances
are enlarged. Those distances can then be filtered-out and the
position can be computed with the remaining set of distances.
This detection is performed such that the position of is com-
puted independently in each triangle. If in a given triangle the
computation is successful, then all the distance bounds from the
verifiers forming that triangle are considered correct; otherwise,
all three distance bounds are considered suspicious (see Fig. 5).
In this algorithm, the number of verification triangles and the
number of enlarged distances will determine if the algorithm
can detect which distance(s) is(are) enlarged. Nevertheless, in
all cases, even if the number of verifiers is strictly equal to three,
the VM algorithm will detect any distance enlargement attack
(even if only one distance is enlarged), but it will not always be
able to detect which distance it is.
VM can be also applied to 3-D positioning. For this, the
system requires a minimum of four verifiers, that form a trian-
gular pyramid, within which the secure determination of the
claimant’s position is possible. The algorithm is then executed
in a way similar to the 2-D case.
B. Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security properties of VM in
various scenarios. We observe VM with distance bounding or
with authenticated ranging, assuming trusted or untrusted users,
and with radio-based or ultrasound-based bounding/ranging.
Verifiable Multilateration With Distance Bounding: The
most important properties of the VM mechanism with distance
bounding can be summarized as follows.
1) A node located at position within the triangle/pyramid
formed by the verifiers cannot prove to be at another po-
sition within the same triangle/pyramid.
2) A node located outside the triangle/pyramid cannot prove
to be at any position within the triangle/pyramid.
Fig. 6. Device cloning/user collusion. The attacker clones a device u and
places one clone close to each verifier. The clones seem to the verifiers as a
single device and can use distance enlargement to show that u is at any position
within the verification triangle. Alternatively, three users collude in proving an
incorrect position of node u.
3) An external attacker performing a distance enlargement
attack cannot trick the verifiers into believing that a
claimant located at a location in the triangle/pyramid
is located at some other position in the tri-
angle/pyramid.
An external attacker performing a distance enlargement
attack cannot trick the verifiers into believing that a claimant
is located at any position within the triangle/pyramid, if the
claimant is located outside of the triangle/pyramid.
These properties hold for verifiable multilateration based
on radio distance bounding (VM-RF-DB) in environments in
which the signal propagates at the speed-of-light, and for an
internal attacker that controls a single device (the claimant).
VM-RF-DB, therefore, resists to external attacks and to internal
attacks from a single untrusted/compromised node.
However, if an attacker owns several devices and each device
can authenticate to the authority as the same entity, the attacker
can still successfully cheat on its position. The attacker can place
three/four devices within the triangle/triangular pyramid, such
that each device is close to one of the verifiers. Each of the de-
vices can then show to its corresponding base station (by de-
laying the messages) that it is positioned at any distance larger
than their actual distance (which is small). As to the base sta-
tions these devices appear to be a single claimant, the attacker
can prove to be at any distance to the base stations and, thus, at
any position in the verification triangle/triangular pyramid. This
attack is shown on Fig. 6. Here, the attacker clones its device, or
three attackers collude to appear as a single node to the verifiers.
This enables the attacker (or colluding nodes) to prove that the
position of the claimant is at an incorrect place within the veri-
fication triangle.
A solution that prevents this attack is to make claimant de-
vices tamper-proof such that their authentication material is not
revealed to the attacker and that they cannot be cloned; however,
as shown in [2], tamper-proofness has its limitations. Another
possibility is that the base stations perform device fingerprinting
[37] by which they identify each device as unique. In that case,
the base stations can identify a claimant device by the unique
“fingerprint” that characterizes its signal transmission.1
1This process is used by cellular network operators to prevent cloning fraud;
namely, a cloned phone does not have the same fingerprint as the legal phone
with the same electronic identification numbers.
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TABLE II
RESISTANCE OF VM TO ATTACKS. RF=RADIO COMMUNICATION, US=ULTRASONIC COMMUNICATION,
DB=DISTANCE-BOUNDING, AR=AUTHENTICATED RANGING, DF=DEVICE FINGERPRINTING, UW=UNDERWATER
Verifiable multilateration with ultrasonic distance bounding
(VM-US-DB) in air, exhibits only properties (1)and (2), meaning
that it protects the positioning system from an untrusted claimant,
but not against an external attacker nor from colluding internal
attackers (claimants). However, if the devices are under water,
VM-US-DB can exhibit the same properties as VM-RF-DB;
this is because, underwater, the communication is limited to
ultrasonic signals. VM-US-DB can be attacked if an attacker
can use surface wormholes to perform distance reduction [22].
Verifiable Multilateration With Authenticated Ranging
(VM-RF-AR): VM-RF-AR exhibits only properties 3 and 4 of
the VM-RF-DB. This means that this scheme provides protec-
tion against external attacks, but not against untrusted claimants
(internal attackers). VM-RF-AR is, therefore, most suitable
for secure positioning systems in which the infrastructure (the
verifiers) and the users (the claimants) are mutually trusted. In
these scenarios, VM-RF-AR resists to all distance enlargement
attacks by external attackers.
Verifiable multilateration with ultrasonic authenticated rang-
ing (VM-US-AR) exhibits the same properties as VM-RF-AR,
but only in underwater communications, whereas in air, it does
not provide any security at all.
The results of this analysis are summarized in Table II.
C. Maximum Attacker Impact
In this section, we analyze the impact of distance measure-
ment errors on VM. As we have already described, for the com-
puted position to be accepted by the verifiers, each distance
bound needs to be less than different from the distance be-
tween the computed position and the verifier measuring that dis-
tance bound. We defined as the expected positioning error.
Here, we define more precisely as , where is the expected
standard deviation of the computed position. This means that we
expect, with probability of 0.997 (the confidence interval corre-
sponding to ) that the real node position will lay in the circle
of radius around the computed position .
Within the VM this means that the maximal attacker impact
on the computed position is upper-bounded by .
To estimate the expected of an UWB positioning system,
we used the results of the distance measurements between UWB
base stations and UWB tags, published by Multispectral Solu-
tions [1]. These results show that for indoor positioning, the
standard deviation of the measured distances increases with the
distance length. The measured distances were from 0 to 50 m,
and the standard deviation was from 0 to 1 m. From these dis-
tance measurements, we computed the standard deviation of the
positions within a verifiable triangle formed by the three base
stations. The results of this computation are shown on Fig. 7.
The values on the and axis denote the measured positions,
Fig. 7. Standard deviation () of the position computed with MMSE of
distance measurements to a UWB tag, performed by three UWB base stations.
Positioning is performed within a triangle formed by the three base stations.
and the axis denotes the standard deviation of the position.
We observe that the standard deviation is the highest at posi-
tions close to the base stations. This is an expected result, due
to geometric dilution of precision. It is also important to observe
that the value of is lower than 0.5 m in the center part of the
triangle, and that it increases to 1 m for positions closer to the
base stations.
Given that the verifiers do not know a priory if the position
that they computed is correct or not, VM cannot operate with ,
as it depends on the computed position. This is notably because
we do not want to give any advantage to the attacker by allowing
him to modify the distances (the position) in order to influence
the choice of . VM, therefore, needs to operate in a “worst case”
scenario with a fixed value for . This also means that needs to
be chosen such that the positions which are not spoofed are not
likely to be rejected, and that the positions which are spoofed
are detected.
It is important to notice that by choosing , the verifiers are
sure that the positions at which will not be rejected
if there was no attack on the distances. This means that by
choosing different s, the verifiers will modify the verification
area; for larger , the verification region will be larger, but so
will be the maximum attacker impact.
D. Location Privacy
So far, we have described the infrastructure-based verifiable
multilateration (IB-VM), in which the verifiers compute the po-
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Fig. 8. Attacks on sensor network positioning.
sition of the claimant. IB-VM does not preserve the claimant’s
location privacy. There are two reasons for that. The first reason
is that the verifiers compute the position of the claimant and,
therefore, have full knowledge of where the claimant is located.
The second reason is that the described distance bounding and
ranging protocols are vulnerable to attacks by fake verifiers
whose goal is to detect the position of a node by initiating
the execution of the distance-bounding protocol. This second
problem can be eliminated If the verifiers are authenticated
to the claimants prior to the distance verification. In [38],
Capkun et al., proposed a protocol for mutually authenticated
distance bounding (MAD) that enables two nodes to determine
their mutual distance bounds at the time of encounter. This
protocol can be used to prevent attacks by fake verifiers.
Still, even with mutual claimant-verifier authentication
IB-VM does not fully protect the claimant’s location privacy, be-
cause the infrastructure knows the location of the claimant. This
problem can be solved through node-based verifiable multilater-
ation (NB-VM). In this protocol, the claimant performs distance
bounding to the verifiers, and computes its location within the
verification triangle in the same way as in the protocol in Fig. 4.
Here, the claimant trusts the verifiers about their positions, but
not does allow them to find out its position. However, the verifiers
could try to infer the claimant’s position based on the readings of
the strengths of the signals received from the claimant. This, and
similar attacks on node’s location privacy have been previously
investigated [15], [20], [21], [31], [33], [34], but thwarting
these attacks is out of the scope of this paper.
V. SECURE POSITIONING IN SENSOR NETWORKS
In this section, we review attacks on sensor network posi-
tioning systems. We then propose solutions for secure posi-
tioning in sensor networks.
A. Threat Analysis
Threats on positioning in sensor networks are more severe
than if positioning is performed directly by trusted base stations.
This is because of the distributed nature of the majority of sensor
network positioning algorithms. Namely, to reduce the number
of trusted base stations needed to position all the sensors in the
network, most of the positioning algorithms rely on sensor co-
operation for computing node positions.
One of the most obvious threats to sensor networks is the
physical displacement of nodes. An external attacker can phys-
ically displace nodes from their original positions to other posi-
tions in the network, or can temporarily or permanently remove
the nodes from the network while this remains undetected to the
nodes or to the network authority. If the network is not properly
protected, an attacker can create the impression to the displaced
node and to its neighbors that the node did not move; a simple
approach for the attacker is to create a communication link to
the new position of the honest node. This attack, that we call the
node displacement attack is illustrated in Fig. 8, case a).
Even without displacing the nodes, external attackers can still
perform a number of attacks on node positions and network
topology. An example of this behavior is the wormhole attack
shown in Fig. 8, case b), by which the attacker establishes links
between nodes that are not in each others’ power range. Be-
sides the establishment of new links, attackers can permanently
or temporarily jam the communication between pairs of nodes
and, thus, by remove links that would normally exist. Further-
more, an attacker can jam and replay the messages between the
nodes and, therefore, enlarge the distances between the nodes
(Fig. 8, case c).
Attacks by internal attackers are simpler to perform and can
be more harmful than those performed by external attackers.
Internal attackers can modify the computed network topology
by reporting nonexisting links, or by not establishing or not
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reporting the links that would normally be established. The
false position and distance dissemination attack is illustrated
in Fig. 8, case d).
B. System Model
Our secure positioning system consists of a set of sensor
nodes and a set of reference nodes (landmarks) with known
locations. Nodes and verifiers communicate using radio trans-
missions. We assume that the radio link between neighbors is
bidirectional.
We assume that the sensor nodes have distance-measuring ca-
pabilities, but are not equipped with GPS receivers. The nodes
are able to measure the distances to their neighbors or to the
landmarks by using time-of-arrival or round-trip time measure-
ments with radio signals. The nodes are also able to bound their
processing delays to a few nanoseconds.
We assume that the network is operated by an authority. The
authority controls the network membership and assigns a unique
identity to each node. Each node is able to generate symmetric
cryptographic keys and, more generally, to accomplish any task
required to secure its communications. All network nodes can
establish pairwise secret keys. This can be achieved by manually
preloading all keys into the nodes in a network setup phase, by
probabilistic key predistribution schemes [7], [11], or through
an on-line key distribution center [18].
We observe two scenarios. In the first scenario, sensors are
positioned directly by the landmark stations. In the second sce-
nario, the sensor cooperate to compute their positions and the
number of landmarks is significantly smaller.
C. Direct Sensor Positioning
If the sensors are being positioned directly by the land-
mark stations (verifiers), secure positioning is straightforward
through the application of VM. This can be enabled by a
network of landmarks which can be fixed, with predetermined
positions, randomly distributed over the area of interest, or
even mobile. The number of verifiers needed to cover an area,
such that position verification can be performed in the whole
area, depends on the number of verifiers and their (and mobile
nodes’) power ranges. So far, we have assumed that the power
range of each verifier can cover the verification triangle and that
the position verification is, thus, enabled in the whole triangle.
This is, however, not true in general; the verification triangle is
the largest possible region in which three verifiers can verify
node positions. If the power ranges of the verifiers are such that
they do not cover the whole triangle, the verification region can
be smaller than the verification triangle. Only if the verifiers
are in each others’ power ranges will the verification region be
equal to the verification triangle.
For this reason, the optimal way to cover an area of interest
is to place verifiers within the area such that they form regular
triangles with sides equal to their power ranges. In this case, the
number of verifiers needed to cover a square area of is
where is the area width and length and is the power range of
the verifiers and mobile nodes. In this way, each verifier (except
Fig. 9. Number of verifiers required to cover an area (LL) with verification
triangles. The power range is 250 m.
for the boundary verifiers) will be a verifier in six triangles (i.e.,
in a hexagon).
We now consider the case in which, instead of being prede-
ployed on fixed locations, the verifiers are uniformly distributed
over the area of interest. We performed simulations to deter-
mine the number of verifiers necessary to cover the area. This
coverage will depend on the sizes and the positions of the
verification triangles formed by the verifiers. Our simulations
were performed on areas of variable sizes (from 500 500
to with verifiers power ranges of 250 m). To
avoid boundary effects, the verifiers were uniformly distributed
in the area and in a boundary region outside the area, whose
width was 10% of the area width.
The results of an average of 100 simulations are shown in Fig. 9
and are displayed with confidence intervals of 95%. As expected,
an optimal placement of verifiers is much more efficient than
their random placement, in terms of number of verifiers.
However, for security purposes, in some scenarios, it might
be advantageous for the verifiers to be randomly placed, to ran-
domly move within the area of interest and, thus, not to have
their positions known at all times. Verifier mobility could also
prevent the cloning attack. If the sensors are mobile, their trajec-
tories can be reconstructed based on the verified positions [17].
D. Cooperative Positioning: SPINE
In some application scenarios, a larger number of landmarks
cannot be deployed, or is expensive to deploy. For those sce-
narios, we propose a secure cooperative positioning mechanism
called SPINE: Secure Positioning for sensor NEtworks algo-
rithm. SPINE is based on VM. The algorithm is executed in
three phases: 1) the sensors measure distance bounds to their
neighbors; 2) the distance bounds are verified through VM; and
3) the positions of the nodes are computed by the sensors using
a distributed algorithm, or by the central authority, using a cen-
tralized positioning algorithm. SPINE algorithm is shown on
Fig. 10.
BDV stands for Basic Distance Verification (BDV) (Fig. 11);
it relies on VM. The BDV of the distance between and is
performed by: 1) forming verification triangles around with
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Fig. 10. SPINE algorithm.
Fig. 11. Basic distance verification (BDV). To verify a distance, a set of
triangles is formed around the distance.
and its neighbors; 2) by forming verification triangles around
with and its neighbors; and 3) by forming verifiable trian-
gles around and . In our example, the following triangles
are formed around : , , ,
and ; only a single triangle is formed
around . Finally, a triangle is formed around
both and . After forming the triangles, the measured distance
bounds (from to ) and (from to ) are verified in
all triangles, by performing VM over and , respectively. This
is done in such a way that the nodes forming a triangle define a
local coordinate system, in which they then compute the posi-
tion of or , or the positions of both and . The computation
of the position of and is performed with VM through which
the distance bounds and are then verified. Verifica-
tion of the distance bound is successful within BDV only if in
all verification triangles the measured distance bounds and
match the computed positions (with a tolerance of ). The
algorithm is executed as shown on Fig. 12.
The set contains those distance bounds that can be ver-
ified by at least one triangle. The distance bounds that cannot
be verified are included into a set of nonverified distances.
Once the selection process is finished, the positions of the nodes
can be computed by using only verified distances from the set
. Finally, the computed positions of the nodes are compared
with the nonverified distances from .
The computation of the positions of the nodes can be per-
formed by a number of centralized or distributed range-based
positioning algorithms (see Section VI). Note here that the BDV
algorithm can be executed locally as the nodes forming a tri-
angle are in each other’s power ranges.
The effectiveness of any of the used positioning techniques
(and consequently of SPINE) depends on the number of node
neighbors (node density) and on the number and the spatial dis-
tribution of landmarks. The number of node neighbors is crucial
Fig. 12. Basic distance verification (BDV) algorithm.
Fig. 13. Average number of neighbors per node and average number of
verifiable distances adjacent to a node.
to ensure that the positions of most of the nodes can be com-
puted. The requirements for secure positioning are higher: it is
necessary that the network is sufficiently dense to ensure that
the positions of most nodes can be securely computed.
To show the difference between the density requirements for
secure and nonsecure positioning, we observe average number
of distance bounds to the neighbors that can be verified with
BDV (the distances that are used for secure positioning), and
the average number of node neighbors (the distances used for
nonsecure positioning). We performed simulations on an area
of 100 100 m, with 50 to 500 uniform randomly distributed
nodes with power ranges of 25 m. The results are presented in
Fig. 13 with 95% confidence intervals.
As expected, the results show that to perform secure po-
sitioning equivalently to nonsecure positioning (meaning
with approximately the same number of distances), a higher
density of nodes is required. For nonsecure positioning, an
average of ten distances per node (ten neighbors) is reached
already with , whereas for secure
positioning, an average of ten verifiable distances requires at
least .
We further computed the average percentage of nodes cov-
ered by at least one verification triangle. These results are shown
in Fig. 14. This figure is important as it shows that at node den-
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Fig. 14. Average percentage of nodes covered by at least one verification
triangle, with and without boundary nodes.
sity of , most of the nodes are covered
by at least one verification triangle, meaning that their adjacent
distances and their position can be verified. As expected, the
figure shows that the boundary nodes are not covered by veri-
fication triangles. This is an important indication that the land-
mark stations need to be specifically placed at the boundaries of
the area to protect boundary nodes from attacks by enabling the
formation of verification triangles around them.
E. Security Analysis
The resistance of SPINE relies on the resistance of BDV to
attacks; it depends on the ability of the attacker to modify the
verified distances, but also on the positioning algorithm used to
compute node positions with verified distances.
Here, we primarily analyze the resistance of BDV to attacks.
We then discuss security implications of using BDV with several
positioning algorithms.
The resistance of BDV to attacks depends on the number and
on the mutual dependence of triangles that are formed around
the distance. To spoof a distance verified by a single triangle,
it is sufficient for an external attacker to enlarge two distances
(the distance , and one additional distance between the nodes
forming a triangle). This is illustrated on Fig. 15, where dis-
tances and are enlarged. By enlarging these two dis-
tances, all the distances in the verification triangle remain mu-
tually consistent. This attack can be performed by an external
attacker.
If only a single node in a triangle is compromised, this node
can enlarge distances to the claimant and to other nodes forming
the verification triangle. This is illustrated on Fig. 16. In this
example, node is compromised, and enlarges distances to ,
, and to such that all the distances in the verification triangle
remain mutually consistent. Similarly to the attack on Fig. 15, if
the attacker controls one compromised and one external node,
it can enlarge the measured distance even if the compromised
node is not adjacent to the distance. This essentially means that
a single-triangle BDV resists only to attacks that enlarge only a
single distance.
Fig. 15. Example of distance enlargement attack by external nodes on
a single-triangle BDV. Distance d (a) before enlargement and (b) after
enlargement.
Fig. 16. Example of a distance enlargement attack by a compromised node
(v) on a single-triangle BDV. Distance d (a) before enlargement and (b) after
enlargement.
If verification triangles can be formed around a distance,
the resistance of BDV to attacks can be expressed in terms of
. If the triangles are node-disjoint, then BDV resists to up to
distance enlargements. This is intuitive, as the distance is
verified by disjoint triangles, and an attacker needs to spoof the
verification process in each of the triangles to successful cheat
on the measured distance.
If the triangles are node-joint and edge-disjoint, then BDV
also resists to up to distance enlargements by external at-
tackers, but it does not resist attacks by a single compromised
node adjacent to the spoofed distance. Essentially, if all trian-
gles have a common (compromised) node, the distance adjacent
to that node can be successfully spoofed. We note here, how-
ever, that the triangles formed around a distance are almost never
node-joint, given that some are formed with and its neighbors
around , others are formed with and its neighbors around ,
whereas the third set of triangles is formed by the neighbors of
and around the two nodes.
If the triangles are edge-joint, then BDV resists to up to
distance enlargements by external attackers. If the nodes are
positioned favorably for the attacker, the attacker can enlarge the
joint edge and enlarge one additional edge from every triangle.
We note here that this attack will not always be possible.
Colluding internal (and external) attackers are the most se-
rious threat to BDV. These attackers can modify arbitrarily the
distances and help each other in providing consistently incor-
rect distance and position information. The number of such at-
tackers needed to cheat on distances depends on the number of
nodes forming triangles around a particular distance. Typically,
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Fig. 17. Average number of verification triangles and an average number of
edge-disjoint verification triangles that can be formed around a distance.
colluding internal attackers need to share mutual authentication
material and need to be placed close to the verifiers to perform
a successful attack.
We performed simulations on a network of sensors with den-
sities from 50 to and a power range
of 25 m. We computed the average number of verification trian-
gles and an average number of edge-disjoint verification trian-
gles that can be formed around a distance (Fig. 17). The results
show that BDV, depending on the node density and node posi-
tions, can resist to attacks up to 100 distance enlargements.
To compromise the computation of the position of a single
node, an attacker needs to modify the computation and the ver-
ification of the (verified) distances surrounding the node. Fur-
thermore, the attacker needs to make all the modified distances
and positions consistent with the positions of other nodes in the
network. The difficulty for the attacker here is in distance en-
largement. Essentially, when the attacker enlarges distances, it
makes some nodes to appear further from each other, but also
makes some unavoidably to appear closer. This is why in a very
dense network, the attacker could only scale-up all the distances
in the network, but it would not be able to, by changing a smaller
number of distances, successfully modify the computed posi-
tions of the nodes.
VI. RELATED WORK
In the last decade, a number of indoor positioning systems
were proposed, based notably on infrared [41], ultrasound [30],
[42], received radio signal strength [3], [6], [16], and ToF radio
signal propagation techniques [12], [25]. These positioning
techniques were then extended and used for positioning in wire-
less ad hoc networks [5], [8]–[10], [28], [29], [32], [36], [39].
Recently, a number of secure distance and location verifica-
tion have been proposed. Brands and Chaum [4] proposed a dis-
tance bounding protocol that can be used to verify the proximity
of two devices connected by a wired link. Sastry et al. [35] pro-
posed a new distance bounding protocol, based on ultrasound
and radio wireless communication. In that work, the authors also
propose to make use of multiple base stations to narrow down
the area in which the nodes lie. However, as this proposal is
based on ultrasound distance bounding, it can, therefore, be used
only for the verification of nodes’ positions, and only if external
nodes have no access to the area of interest. In [19], the authors
propose a mechanism called “packet leashes” that aims at pre-
venting wormhole attacks by making use of the geographic lo-
cation of the nodes (geographic leashes), or of the transmission
time of the packet between the nodes (temporal leashes). Kuhn
[23] proposed an asymmetric security mechanism for naviga-
tion signals. That proposal aims at securing systems like GPS
[14]. Lazos et al. [24] proposed a set of techniques for secure
positioning of a network of sensors based on directional an-
tennas and distance bounding. Li et al. [26] propose statistical
methods for securing localization in wireless sensor networks.
Liu et al. [27] propose techniques for the detection of mali-
cious attacks against beacon-based location discovery in sensor
networks, based on consistency of received beacons. In [40],
Capkun et al. propose a secure localization scheme based on
hidden and mobile base stations, which makes use of the unpre-
dictability of the base station locations.
Recently, a number of proposals have been made to protect
the anonymity and location privacy of wireless devices [15],
[20], [21], [31], [33], [34].
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed positioning and distance
estimation techniques in adversarial settings. We have shown
that most proposed positioning techniques are vulnerable to
position spoofing attacks from internal and external attackers.
We have further shown that positioning and distance estimation
techniques, based on radio signal propagation, exhibit the best
properties for position verification. We have proposed a novel
mechanism for position verification, called VM. VM enables
for the secure computation and verification of node positions in
the presence of attackers. We have further proposed SPINE, a
system for secure positioning in a network of sensors, based on
VM. We have shown that this system resists against distance
modification attacks from a large number of attacker nodes.
Our future work includes a detailed analysis and possible
implementation of distance bounding and position verification
techniques. Furthermore, we intend to investigate the applica-
bility of our basic distance verification scheme to a number of
existing positioning algorithms.
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